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Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback 
 
 
Cary Coglianese* 
President Obama has rightly called on government agencies to estab-
lish ongoing routines for reviewing existing regulations to determine 
if they need modification or repeal.  Over the last two years, the 
White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
has overseen a signature regulatory “lookback” initiative that has 
prompted dozens of federal agencies to review hundreds of regula-
tions.  This regulatory initiative represents a good first step toward 
increasing the retrospective review of regulation, but by itself will do 
little to build a lasting culture of serious regulatory evaluation.  After 
all, past administrations have made similar review efforts, but these 
ad hoc exercises have never taken root.  If President Obama is seri-
ous about institutionalizing the practice of retrospective review, his 
Administration will need to take further steps in the coming years.  
This essay offers three feasible actions – guidelines, plans, and 
prompts – that President Obama’s next OIRA Administrator should 
take to move forward with regulatory lookback and improve both the 
regularity and rigor of regulatory evaluation. 
Responding to an executive order from President Obama, 
dozens of federal agencies over the last two years have undertaken 
extensive reviews of the regulations on their books, looking for anti-
quated, counterproductive, or unnecessary rules that should be modi-
                                                          
* Cary Coglianese is the Edward B. Shils Professor of Law, Professor of Political 
Science, and Director of the Penn Program on Regulation at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School.  This essay is based upon remarks delivered at a Pro-
gressive Policy Institute (PPI) forum on “Regulating in the Digital Age” in Wash-
ington, D.C., on May 9, 2013.  The author is grateful for helpful comments from 
Brady Sullivan, Jonathan Wiener, participants at the PPI forum, and the editorial 
team at the Yale Journal on Regulation. 
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fied or eliminated.  According to the Administration, agencies have 
collectively completed more than five hundred regulatory reviews 
and initiated policy modifications expected to yield cost savings in 
the billions of dollars.  These results look good, to be sure, but they 
are only a small step toward achieving the Administration’s broader 
goal of institutionalizing retrospective regulatory analysis.  To avoid 
squandering the progress made so far, the Administration must use 
the next several years to take additional steps to improve retrospec-
tive regulatory analysis and identify still better targets for the applica-
tion of more rigorous evaluation research. 
The Obama Administration has sometimes characterized its 
existing retrospective review initiative as “historic”1 and “unprece-
dented.”2  But actually it is far from unprecedented.  President Clin-
ton issued an executive order requiring agencies to develop programs 
by which they would “periodically review” existing regulations,3 and 
Vice President Gore oversaw a government-wide regulatory review 
process that trimmed a sizeable number of pages of outmoded rules 
from the Code of Federal Regulations.4  Under President George W. 
Bush, the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) invited members of the public to nominate existing rules 
needing review and reconsideration, a process which led to the scru-
                                                          
1 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, White House Announces 
New Steps to Cut Red Tape, Eliminate Unnecessary Regulations (May 10, 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/10/white-house-announces-
new-steps-cut-red-tape-eliminate-unnecessary-regul. 
2 Cass Sunstein, A Smarter Approach to Regulation (August 7, 2012), http://www.-
whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/08/07/smarter-approach-regulation. 
3 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 §5 (1993). 
4 See, e.g., John Kamensky, Assistant to the Deputy Dir. of Mgmt., U.S. Office of 
Mgmt. and Budget, The U.S. Reform Experience: The National Performance Re-
view, Presentation at Indiana University at the Conference on Civil Service Sys-
tems in Comparative Perspectives, Indiana University (April 6, 1997), available at 
http://gov-info.library.unt.edu/npr/library/papers/bkgrd/kamensky.html. 
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tiny of nearly four hundred rules and regulatory guidance docu-
ments.5 
Although retrospectively reviewing regulation is far from 
new, what makes the Obama Administration’s latest round of review 
distinctive is its laudable but ambitious goal of institutionalizing the 
practice of what the Administration calls regulatory lookback.6  Pres-
ident Obama’s first OIRA Administrator, Cass Sunstein, proclaimed 
that the Administration’s lookback would not be a “one-time endeav-
or” as in previous administrations; instead, the Obama Administra-
tion’s lookback aspires to be just a first step toward building “a regu-
latory culture of regular evaluation.”7 
Widespread acceptance of continuous regulatory review is 
exactly what is needed to fulfill what President Obama has rightly 
characterized as the government’s duty to “measure, and seek to im-
prove, the actual results of regulatory requirements.”8  Unfortunately, 
the federal government’s treatment of retrospective regulatory review 
still lags far behind agencies’ practice of prospectively analyzing 
proposed regulations, a process institutionalized by President Reagan 
and overseen by OIRA for the last thirty years.  It is fair to say that 
retrospective review is today where prospective analysis was in the 
1970s: ad hoc and largely unmanaged. 
                                                          
5 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION: 2002 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND 
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 4 (noting that 316 
regulations and guidance documents were considered in 2002, in addition to 71 in 
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb-
/inforeg/2002_report_to_congress.pdf.   
6 Exec. Order No. 13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,467 (May 14, 2012) (calling for agency 
action “to institutionalize regular assessment of significant regulations”). 
7 Cass Sunstein, Regulation: Looking Backward, Looking Forward, Address Before 
the 2012 A.B.A. Admin. L. & Reg. Pract. Sec., Washington, D.C., May 10, 2012, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/speeches/-
regulation-looking-backward-looking-forward-05102012.pdf.  
8 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3, 21 (2011).  
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Without doing more, the Obama Administration’s recent 
lookback initiative will end up in the same dustbin as the regulatory 
review processes initiated under Clinton and Bush.  Sure, some dis-
crete improvements in specific regulations will likely result, but ret-
rospective review will remain a periodic and unsystematic fancy ra-
ther than a serious, ongoing part of regulatory policymaking. 
How to move forward?  One way would be to create a new, 
independent regulatory institution dedicated to retrospective review, 
along the lines of proposals offered by, among others, Michael 
Greenstone of MIT and Michael Mandel and Diana Carew of the 
Progressive Policy Institute.9  There is much to be said for such pro-
posals.  But as anyone who follows Washington politics knows, it 
will undoubtedly take considerable time—not to mention clout—
before Congress might enact even such appealingly bipartisan pro-
posals. Even if a new institution were to be authorized, funded, and 
staffed, it would take still more time for that body to begin to conduct 
reviews and make recommendations.  The Obama team would likely 
be in its closing days, if not gone from Washington altogether, by the 
time a new institution could begin to have an impact. 
Fortunately, the Obama Administration does not need to wait 
for the creation of a new institution before taking steps to embed 
evaluation more deeply and permanently into the regulatory process.  
Acting entirely on its own, the Administration can still move forward 
with action that will help institutionalize retrospective review for the 
next three years and beyond.  Specifically, the White House’s OIRA 
should issue government-wide regulatory evaluation guidelines, re-
                                                          
9 Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation 
and Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 111 (David Moss & John 
Cisternino, eds., 2009); MICHAEL MANDEL & DIANA G. CAREW, PROGRESSIVE 
POL’Y INST., REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT COMMISSION: A POLITICALLY VIABLE 
APPROACH TO U.S. REGULATORY REFORM (2013), available at http://www.progres-
sivepolicy.org/2013/05/regulatory-improvement-commission-a-politically-viable-
approach-to-u-s-regulatory-reform/. 
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quire the creation of evaluation plans for significant rules as part of 
the prospective review process, and adapt the practice developed by 
George W. Bush’s OIRA of issuing “prompt letters” so as to promote 
targeted, value-added regulatory evaluation. 
Evaluation Guidelines.  OIRA first needs to establish specific 
guidelines for agencies to follow in conducting retrospective evalua-
tions of existing regulations.  At present, far too many agencies’ re-
views are little more than glances in the rearview mirror, drawing 
mainly on anecdotes and expert impressions.  Glances back may be 
better than nothing, but they fall far short of what it will take to create 
a credible, evidence-based approach to regulation.  Rather than rely-
ing on impressions, the federal government needs careful, systematic 
research that addresses the question of causation:  What benefits and 
costs can actually be attributed to a regulation after it has been im-
plemented?10 Getting reliable answers to this causal question re-
quires adherence to exacting standards for research design and statis-
tical analysis, yet federal agencies currently lack clear guidance about 
how to conduct high quality retrospective reviews. 
It is instructive that when it comes to producing prospective 
regulatory analysis, agencies can turn to OIRA’s Circular A-4, a 
lengthy document that provides both a general guide to conducting 
regulatory analysis as well as concrete prescriptions for analysts to 
follow.  Circular A-4 offers regulatory analysts in agencies specific 
instructions, such as, “You should not use benefit transfer in estimat-
ing benefits if resources are unique or have unique attributes,” and, 
“You should provide estimates of net benefits using both 3 percent 
and 7 percent” discount rates.11 
                                                          
10 Cary Coglianese, Evaluating the Impact of Regulation and Regulatory Policy, 
(OECD Expert Paper No. 1, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/gov/regula-
tory-policy/1_coglianese web.pdf. 
11 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS (Sept. 17, 
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/-
regulatory_matters_pdf/a-4.pdf.  
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Admittedly, some of what can be found in Circular A-4 may 
also be helpful in conducting retrospective analysis, but nothing in A-
4 offers a specific framework for approaching retrospective evalua-
tion.  The Circular contains nothing about making causal attributions 
by estimating counterfactuals or about how to undertake statistical 
analysis of regulatory impacts.  If the Obama Administration is seri-
ous about deepening and strengthening regulatory review, at the very 
least it should create retrospective evaluation guidelines comparable 
to Circular A-4.   
Evaluation Plans.  Issuing evaluation guidelines is not only 
the most feasible action the Administration could take in the near 
term, it also would provide a foundation upon which to base addi-
tional steps.  One such additional step would be to require agencies to 
include in each prospective regulatory impact analysis (RIA) a plan 
for the subsequent evaluation of the proposed rule.  An evaluation 
plan would constitute only a small part of an overall RIA, and it 
would be non-binding in the sense that an agency would not be obli-
gated to carry out the plan.  Nevertheless, such a plan would provide 
a future guide whenever the agency, OIRA, or the public does later 
deem it appropriate to look back at the rule after it has been imple-
mented.  A plan for retrospective evaluation should, among other 
things, discuss: 
• ways of operationalizing the proposed rule’s objectives, 
specifying metrics that could be used in the future to assess 
whether each objective had been met; 
• sources of data that either currently exist or would need to 
be developed in order to estimate the impact of the rule on 
the specified metrics; 
• the time frame when the rule’s objectives could be ex-
pected to accrue or, relatedly, the time frame when retro-
spective evaluation would be appropriate; and 
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• research or analytic designs that could be used in evaluat-
ing the rule (e.g., sources of cross-sectional or longitudi-
nal variation, other potential explanatory factors that 
might need to be controlled, and possible statistical ap-
proaches to estimating counterfactuals). 
An evaluation plan would be useful if the agency later re-
examined the rule in a future administration’s lookback process.  
Such planning also would help prompt agencies early in the rule de-
velopment process—even when proposed rules are being drafted—to 
begin to think about retrospective evaluation needs, such as what data 
could be collected or identified in advance of the rule’s implementa-
tion in order to facilitate subsequent measurement.  Evaluation plans 
should be made publicly available, and as such they may help stimu-
late independent evaluation research by other entities, including the 
Administrative Conference of the United States, the National Acad-
emy of Sciences, and the National Academy of Public Administra-
tion, as well as by university and think-tank researchers. 
OIRA is well positioned to oversee formal evaluation plan-
ning as part of regulatory development.  Imposing a requirement for 
the submission of formal evaluation plans would serve to implement 
the periodic review of existing significant regulations demanded un-
der both Section 6 of Executive Order 13,56312 and Section 5 of Ex-
ecutive Order 12,866,13 not to mention the provisions of Executive 
Order 13,610.14  In addition, since the data needed for evaluation may 
at times call for information-collection requests, OIRA’s role in im-
plementing the Paperwork Reduction Act15 would also make it an 
appropriate entity to interact with agencies over plans for evaluation. 
                                                          
12 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,822 (2011).  
13 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,739 (1993). 
14 Exec. Order No. 13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,467, 28,469 (2012). 
15 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521 (2012). 
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Evaluation Prompts.  Finally, OIRA should extend to the 
context of retrospective review the earlier OIRA practice of sending 
agencies occasional prompt letters.16 Evaluation prompts would 
identify specific existing rules that the Administration believes 
should be targeted for in-depth review, above and beyond whatever 
the agency may do in the ordinary course of the ongoing lookback 
process called for under the existing executive orders.  
Far too many of the retrospective reviews that agencies have 
conducted to date have been impressionistic, rather than systematic or 
rigorously empirical.  Of course, that is to be expected with the short 
time frame agencies have been given under the retrospective review 
initiatives in recent administrations.  Moreover, for some rules no 
more than a close but informal glance back will be warranted.  For 
other rules, though, a more in-depth, serious evaluation will be need-
ed to advance the goals of sound regulatory governance. 
As with regulatory plans, OIRA is well positioned to imple-
ment the prompt letter proposal given its familiarity with rules across 
the entire sweep of the federal government.  Better than any other en-
tity, OIRA can determine what the federal government’s top priorities 
for regulatory evaluation should be.  Specifically, OIRA should issue 
prompt letters calling for in-depth evaluation in at least three types of 
cases:  
 
• Close calls. Rules should be evaluated rigorously when 
they had, at the time they were promulgated, high expected 
costs or benefits but relatively small expected net benefits 
in their RIAs. If the costs of such a rule turned out after im-
plementation to be substantially larger than estimated, or 
                                                          
16 See John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 460-463 (2008) (describing the development and use of 
OIRA’s regulatory prompt letters). 
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the benefits substantially smaller, the rule would no longer 
have benefits that justify its costs. 
• High uncertainty.  Relatedly, rules expected to impose high 
benefits or costs merit subsequent evaluation if the prospec-
tive benefit or cost estimation exhibited high levels of un-
certainty.  For these rules, a follow-on investigation would 
reduce the uncertainty. 
• Common issues.  Rules that present common issues of ei-
ther benefit or cost estimation – or that rely on common as-
sumptions – are prime candidates for rigorous retrospective 
review, as serious efforts to evaluate their benefits and costs 
retrospectively would help validate or improve prospective 
estimation techniques applicable to other rules. 
Although OIRA lacks the capacity to conduct the needed rig-
orous retrospective evaluation research on its own, it is distinctively 
positioned to help identify opportunities like these, where evaluation 
could assist in improving regulatory outcomes, reducing regulatory 
burdens, or validating or improving methods of regulatory impact 
analysis.  OIRA could, of course, also welcome other agencies or 
members of the public to make suggestions for rules that should be 
subjected to evaluation prompt letters. 
OIRA’s prompt letters would urge agencies to allocate inter-
nal agency research funds to conduct in-depth empirical evaluations 
of rules in accord with OIRA’s evaluation guidelines.  Agencies 
could alternatively seek assistance from entities such as the National 
Science Foundation or the National Academy of Sciences to fund or 
facilitate systematic regulatory assessments.  Either way, given 
OIRA’s placement within the Office of Management and Budget, it 
may be positioned to help support the allocation of necessary budget-
ary resources for its priority regulatory evaluations.  OIRA’s statutory 
role in overseeing the Paperwork Reduction Act also positions it to 
stand ready to process expeditiously the approvals of information re-
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quests that may be needed to collect the data needed to undertake 
evaluations subject to prompt letters. 
* * * 
These three proposals—evaluation guidelines, evaluation 
plans, and evaluation prompts—could all be implemented without 
any congressional action shortly after the confirmation of the next 
OIRA Administrator.  Although these three steps by themselves will 
not cure everything that ails the nation’s regulatory system, they nev-
ertheless represent meaningful steps toward better regulatory analysis 
and ultimately better regulation.  Evaluation, after all, is needed to 
identify both real successes and real problems that need fixing.17 
Institutionalizing rigorous evaluation practices will by no 
means come easily.  Rigor and quality have not always described 
even the prospective regulatory impact analyses that agencies have 
been required to complete under OIRA’s oversight for the last several 
decades.18  With time, though, the practice of regulatory analysis can 
improve and deepen.  Building a culture of retrospective evaluation is 
a long-term proposition, and at this juncture it requires taking steps to 
maintain the momentum the Obama Administration has generated 
with its extensive lookback initiative.  The only way to advance the 
administration’s admirable objectives of improving both regulation 
and regulatory evaluation is to keep moving forward with looking 
back. 
                                                          
17 See Cary Coglianese, Thinking Ahead, Looking Back: Assessing the Value of 
Regulatory Impact Analysis and Procedures for Its Use, 3 KOREA LEG. RES. INST. 
J. L. & LEG. 5, 18 (2013) (S. Kor.) (discussing how evaluation research seeks “to 
attribute, causally, both the good and bad outcomes to regulations”). 
18 See Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government 
Do Benefit-Cost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 192, 209 (2007) (analyz-
ing seventy-four federal regulatory impact analyses [RIAs] completed between 
1982-1999 and concluding “that many RIAs are of poor quality”). 
